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Preface
The American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) and its Center for 
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Accountability Cases. This innovative series uses real-world cases to illuminate concepts 
in accountability. Accountability Cases meets a long-felt need for high quality tools to 
be used in learning about accountability. Cases raise issues and dilemmas by linking 
theoretical perspectives with tangible experiences. This case, and other cases in 
accountability , are available for electron ic dow nload at ASPA's w ebsite 
(www.aspanet.org).
The editors invite proposals for cases from academics and practitioners who are able 
to provide detailed accounts of events that illuminate accountability concepts. Please 
send 1-2 page proposals to Robert Schwartz (email: Robert.Schwartz@utoronto.cal 
or to Dan Williams (email: Daniel Williams@baruch.cuny.edul. Cases will be peer 
reviewed and published by ASPA.
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Notes to instructor or leader
This case is divided into the following parts:
(1) Background democratic concepts.
(2) Background ethical concepts.
(3) History of homelessness.
(4) Historical context.
(5) The broader case.
(6) The narrower case, presented as a role playing exercise.
(7) Debriefing information ("What really happened?").
(8) Discussion questions.
(9) A discussion of the broader case with questions.
(10) Bibliography.
We recommend that the student/user read the first five parts before the session in 
which the case is used.
Once the session begins, each student should see only his or her role. Additionally, 
the debriefing information and discussion questions should remain cloaked until 
the conclusion of the role-playing exercise. This cloaking will lead to more authentic 
role-playing. We have purposefully written the roles broadly enough to allow for 
student investment and creativity. Additionally, we have attempted to adhere as 
closely as possible to the facts of the case (as reported by the media). If the instructor 
or leader wishes to add more details to the roles, we would caution that the details 
neither prescribe student attitudes or behaviors nor deviate from the facts of the 
case (as this will complicate the debriefing segment and discussion). If the class size 
necessitates the addition of roles, we suggest adding additional "partner" roles. 
The role-play has been field tested at Baruch College with evidence of positive 
student response and effective learning.
At least 30 minutes should be allotted to this activity; thorough examination can 
extend to an entire class session. The discussion questions in section nine follow the 
order of the background and case materials, but can be re-ordered as the instructor/ 
leader sees fit. Some questions might be appropriate as examination essay questions.
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Introduction and Discussion
The following case draws upon two views of accountability. One is democratic 
accountability the other is accountability to one's own moral conscience. As the 
story unfolds, other facts may get in the way but these central views should not be 
forgotten.
The focus of this case is on the individual. However, the material also covers 
institutional decisions and policies that deserve considering. The institutional story 
is the background, not the foreground, of this case. Yet, when the institutional 
features are considered, they may give new insight to the individuals' decisions.
Democratic Accountability
Democratic accountability implies a unique situation in which sovereignty rests 
with the population at large while government is administered by professionals or 
experts. From the early 1800s to the 1880s, the United States did not face this divide, 
because the use of patronage tied the mechanisms of government to the electoral 
process. Under patronage, elected officials would recommend the selection of 
government workers and sometimes make the selection decision in total. From a 
democratic accountability point of view, the workers were part of the package that 
came with the elected official. If they performed poorly, the remedy was to remove 
their patron, which generally also led to their discharge. From the view of democratic 
accountability, the bureaucrat's only role is to carry out the will of the sovereign 
democratic decision makers. Generally, this means the decision of legislators, who 
should direct the actions of the public staff "to the most minute degree that is 
technically feasible" (Finer 1941, 336). Within this view, to be accountable is to 
report back, demonstrating that one has done what one was told to do. If there is 
evidence of failure, the bureaucrat is punished (Finer 1941; Behn 2001). With the 
advent of Civil Service reforms such as the Pendleton Act in 1883, this linkage was 
lessened (Frantzich and Percy 1994). Lower officers of government became 
employees, professionals, and experts unconnected to the electoral process and, 
thus, not part of the democratic character of government.
From the 1800s to the 1940s, it was argued that this division is good, because the 
types of decisions made by government employees are merely technical, and better 
made by experts than politicians (Goodnow 1900; Wilson 1887). However, since 
the 1940s, the distinction between technical and political decisions has been
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challenged (Appleby 1949; Friedrich 1940). Today, it is commonly believed that the 
day-to-day decisions made by front line "street level" bureaucrats are as much 
policy decisions as are the framing decisions made by legislators or elected executives 
(Lipsky 1980). In New York City the New York Police Department (NYPD) is the 
most readily observable frontline bureaucracy with more than 37,000 uniformed 
officers and a $5 billion slice of the city budget (New York City Independent Budget 
Office, 2005; NYPD, 2006). NYPD personnel continually influence safety policy -  
sometimes even more so than elected officials do. For example, Rudolph Giuliani, 
mayor of New York from 1993 to 2001, directed the police to enforce anti-nuisance 
laws such as ticketing turnstile jumpers in subways. Such enforcement had been 
lax for decades. Early on, the police cooperated with these new requirements. Later, 
however, Giuliani directed the police to ticket jaywalkers (Lombardi 2000), ignoring 
the fact that New Yorkers consider jaywalking to be something close to a civil right. 
The police -  the street level police -  simply would not ticket jaywalking except 
under the watchful eyes of their supervisors. Street level decisions became the real 
policy, which was to ignore jaywalking just as always (Donohue 2001).
Modern democratic accountability involves a tension between accountability for 
compliance with instructions from higher authority and accountability for 
performance. In an ideal democratic model, there is a division between the principal 
(the public or its representative) and the agent (bureaucrat), with accountability in 
the form of the agent reporting to the principal. The principal specifies actions 
through laws and rules and the agent fulfills the specifications through obedient 
compliance. When the agent fails to obey the rules, the principal punishes the 
agent. This somewhat stark description of democratic accountability follows Liner's 
work; however, the general argument of the primacy of publicly selected decision 
makers can be found among top ranked scholarship of the recent past (Moe 1988).
Current scholars often focus on the difference between accountability to the 
sovereign and accountability for the public purpose (Behn 2001; Dubnick 2005; Jos 
and Tompkins 2005; Moe 1988). One common argument is that bureaucratic 
hierarchy is a significant reason for organizational failure in the form of red tape 
and conservative decision making (Howard 1994; Kaufman 1977; Osborne and 
Gaebler 1993). Drawing upon the work of Goodnow, some authors contend that 
public administrators are experts in achieving public ends and should not be 
constrained by the inexpert advice of legislators. Another consideration, which 
draws upon the Liner-Moe formulation of administrative rule, is focused on positive
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instructions for what government should do. Still another accountability concern 
is about catching people doing what they should not be doing (Anechiarico and 
Jacobs 1996; Behn 2001). This branch of democratic accountability involves 
accountability for violation. Under this formulation, "accountable" suggests 
retribution for clearly inappropriate action. A large part of accountability law is 
about retribution and penalty. Anechiarico and Jacobs argue that such law frequently 
misses the mark and adds to the ineffectiveness of government.
Complicating these conceptions of democratic accountability is the relationship 
between the elected official and the electorate. Two competing views of this 
relationship are those of the delegate and the trustee. As a delegate, the institutional 
decision makers are obliged to reflect the wishes of the public at large. The public 
may bear some moral responsibility for poor decisions due to their poor choice of a 
representative. As a trustee, the institutional decision makers are able to make 
separate morally responsible decisions regardless of the will of the public at large. 
If we view the institutional decision makers as trustees, they may personally bear a 
greater share of responsibility for morally reprehensible institutional decisions.
Moral Accountability
There are at least four types of moral accountability to consider. These include: 
Utilitarianism, Kantian Deontology, Aristotelianism, and Social Contractarianism.
From a Utilitarian point of view, the issue to consider is whether an action leads to 
more or less total social good (Mill and Crisp 1998). The exact meaning of "social 
good" is disputed among utilitarians, but it is roughly the total of all the happiness 
experienced in the society, regardless of who in particular experiences it, minus all 
the unhappiness experienced in the society. Under slightly different types of 
utilitarianism, this matter can be "in general" or in regard to a particular case.
For a police officer, failing to enforce the law might lead to more social good under 
some circumstances. It is generally accepted that police officers warn rather than 
cite for some traffic offenses, for example. Citizens do not have a clear understanding 
of the rationale for these warnings, but are usually quite relieved to be warned. 
Limited empirical evidence does not support the view that these warnings are as 
effective as full enforcement (Reinfurt, Campbell, and Stewart 1990). However, the 
combined social good of the drivers' relief multiplied across all drivers receiving 
warnings as well as the partial effectiveness of warnings could result in a net social
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benefit from such warnings. Because such a utilitarian calculus cannot be performed 
explicitly, one must use his or her judgment to evaluate the relative level of societal 
happiness in this instance.
From the point of view of Kantian Deontology (Kant and Abbott 1898; Kant, Heath 
and Schneewind 1997; Kant, Wood, and Schneewind 2002), it is important to consider 
the moral conscience of the government agent, that is, the lesser government official, 
or bureaucrat. Such officials are people who must be honored with the same human 
dignity as the sovereign public. Indeed, democratic sovereignty and human dignity 
both depend upon the respect of individuals. From a Kantian standpoint, it is wrong 
to deny the dignity of anyone, including the government employee. Thus, the 
formulation of democratic accountability as stated above is immoral because it denies 
the officer's right to follow his or her own moral judgm ents. Dem ocratic 
accountability must be reformulated to take into account the dignity and humanity 
of the public employee. That employee must be "an end-in-herself," which means 
she must be able act from her own motivation. If, in her own conscience she is 
repulsed by the express will of the public, she must be free to reject it. Any 
formulation of democratic accountability that restricts this freedom is immoral.
Chester Bernard has made a closely associated argument from moral psychology 
(although he never would have called it that) that people simply will not act against 
their moral core. If democratic accountability conflicts with core moral principles, 
agents will simply refuse to comply with democratic accountability. The expectation 
of such accountability is dependent on the hiring of morally limited employees or it 
is self-defeating (Bernard 1938), because either the agents will ignore their own 
impulses and blindly enforce laws, or they will not comport with the public's 
expectations of them.
A police officer, who interacts with numerous constituents, must also consider the 
moral autonomy of others, such as his or her supervisor, other police officers, 
property owners, individual members of the community, and the public at large.
The Aristotelian may ask whether following the tyrannical will of the masses is 
part of the good life (Aristotle and Ostwald 1962). For Aristotle, the good life is not 
one that is filled with pleasure throughout, always easy or fun. The good life is one 
in which, on the day one dies, one can look back and say, "My life was worth living." 
Americans, who tend to deny death, may think this an easy criterion. However, if 
we acknowledge death, it is actually a difficult criterion. A life worth living may
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lead to hard times where one is at odds with one's society in order to do what is 
right. A life worth living may require struggle, sacrifice, and risk. A life worth 
living may require vision and goals that threaten one's momentary happiness. 
Aristotle also advised moderation, which may mean balance between family and 
work. It may mean balance between personal ideals and social norms.
A police officer may face concerns over the good life and, perhaps, concerns over 
the bureaucratic nature of his or her work. Exchanging the monotony of routine 
for economic security may be personally challenging. When is the work unworthy 
of personal commitment? How does the police officer balance his or her public 
role with private life? What compromises must be made?
A Social Contract is an agreement between a society and its members (Barker 1960; 
Hobbes 1950; Locke and Laslett 1988; Locke and Peardon 1952; Rousseau, Masters 
and Masters 1978), whereby citizens agree to relinquish certain privileges for benefits 
such as protection from bodily harm. For example, citizens might pledge taxes, 
support of the government, and military participation in exchange for public order 
and protection from foreign invasion. Generally, this "social contract theory" is 
thought to be unrealistic in that citizens have little opportunity to actually make 
such pledges, withdraw from the contract, or experience life outside of society. It 
is, however, often used in hypothetical reasoning, that is, thinking about how things 
might be. John Rawls connected it to Kantian thought by appealing to the reader's 
intuition, asking how he would judge universalizable decisions without the 
opportunity for bias (Rawls 1971, see particularly page 11 and note 4; Rawls and 
Kelly 2001). To some degree, constitutional democracy is an imperfect attempt to 
actualize a social contract.
Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein applied the idea of the social contract to 
rights, arguing that all of the "rights" enjoyed by U.S. citizens come at a price (1999). 
Even so-called "negative rights," or simple prohibitions against government 
intrusions into daily life (i.e. the right to free speech, religion, or peaceful assembly), 
come at a price and necessitate government action. Holmes and Sunstein contend, 
"Rights are costly because remedies are costly. Enforcement is expensive.. .and legal 
rights are hollow to the extent they remain unenforced" (1999,43). Thus, the social 
contract always necessitates a strong government role in human affairs, even when 
the government is protecting individuals' rights to be free from the tyrannies of the 
government.
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In the context of the social contract, one role of a police officer is as a representative 
of "the people," fulfilling society's commitment to its members. The police officer 
may consider a member of the public selfish or repugnant when s/he demands that 
the officer enforce laws that seem trivial or unfair. However, as an agent of society, 
the officer has "contracted" to defer his own preferences to those promises society 
has made. Thus, he may have to evict a seemingly downtrodden person for the 
advantage of someone wealthy. Alternatively, he may have to delay an eviction, 
hurting a deserving property-owning friend, while awaiting the full process of the 
law on behalf of tenant who is seemingly irresponsible.
Special Considerations
By now, the reader might ask, why should bureaucrats such as police officers worry 
about moral considerations at all? Why isn't this just a matter of democratic 
accountability? Why shouldn't they just do what they're told to do by their 
supervisors or the public? The best way to answer this is to review Article 8 of the 
Charter of the Nuremberg Trials (the war crimes and holocaust trials after World 
War II). In Article 8, it states: "The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order 
of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may 
be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so 
requires" (Linder 2000). In the Nuremberg Trials, the defendant was the government 
agent. Tire point of this quotation is that the government agent is not free to defer 
his or her judgment to the sovereign state, but remains personally responsible for 
those actions and can be held accountable for them in a court of justice.
Article 8 rests moral and legal accountability on the shoulders of individuals, not 
on society at large. However, the individual must still decide how to resolve his or 
her accountability. Does he resolve it as a Utilitarian? Does she resolve it as a 
Kantian? Is he a Social Contractarian? Perhaps Aristotle guides the decisions? 
Maybe our decision maker has her own moral decision-making calculus.
The history of homelessness
Despite ancient admonitions to "love one's neighbor" and the relative tolerance 
that homeless people encountered centuries ago, "since the enclosure of common 
lands in 16th-century England" (Amster 2003, electronic), "vagrancy began to be 
seen as a threat to the order of things" (Miller 1991, 9, as quoted in Amster 2003). 
The first raft of "Poor Laws" was passed in England in response to rampant
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unemployment and sky-rocketing prices in the late 1500s and early 1600s (Boyer et. 
al. 2000). Parliament issued the laws to pacify upper and middle class citizens who 
worried that the jobless folk wandering the countryside would undermine law and 
order (Boyer et. al. 2000). As Am erica was settled, English common law 
supplemented the "Protestant Work Ethic [that was] intimately connected to the 
national mythos of equal opportunity and free-market meritocracy" (Amster 2003, 
electronic. See also Weber 1958). As in England, homelessness was seen as an issue 
of individual malfeasance rather than structural inequality. In the mid-nineteenth 
century, American efforts to assist the poor exacerbated the problem by requiring 
poor people to leave their homes and move into work houses in order to receive 
funds (Friedman 2002; Boyer et. al. 2000). The workhouse "solution" to poverty not 
only deprived people of their homes, but also subjected them to inhumane living 
conditions. For example, "[i]n 1833 a legislative committee found that the inmates 
of the Boston House of Industry were packed seven to a room and included unwed 
mothers, the sick, and the insane as well as the poor" (Boyer et. al. 2000,291). In the 
late 1800s in New York City, unlucky poor immigrants and homeless people of all 
stripes were "forced into the barracks located in the cellars of police stations... with 
planks for bedding, no ventilation of any kind, and the inhibiting presence, passing 
for protection, of the police" (Sante 1991, 33). Although the homeless were from 
time to time befriended by the likes of such altruists as James Eads, the "hobo 
millionaire," who established shelters, medical facilities, and hobo colleges (Sante 
1991), for the most part they were seen as a defective or diseased lot that threatened 
both public safety and the sterility of public spaces (Amster 2003). The plight of the 
homeless has been especially precarious in New York City due to its sheer size and 
the uniqueness of its historical, cultural, political, and economic climate.
Case Study General Context and Background
New York City is an anomaly. Comprised of five boroughs, each of which is more 
populous than many American states, New York City seems more like its own 
country than a typical metropolis. The culture of the city pulses with the energy of 
its millions of inhabitants, assembled from every corner of the globe into infamous 
neighborhoods such as Hell's Kitchen and Brownsville, Brooklyn. At the heart of it 
all is Manhattan, the borough better known as "The Big Apple." In addition to the 
1.5 million people who call this borough home (Wikipedia 2005), nearly 40 million 
tourists visit the city each year (NYC & Company 2005), and nearly 1 million 
commuters make their way to Manhattan by train, bus, ferry, and car each weekday
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(Herszenhorn 2002). All of these people converge onto a strip of land that is roughly 
13 miles long and 2 miles wide. Thus, on any given day there are a great number of 
people attempting to co-exist peacefully on the tiny island of Manhattan.
Throughout the history of Manhattan, keeping the peace has been a daunting task. 
Herbert Asbury's 1927 account of the city's violence, The Gangs of New York. 
described a past in which "no well-dressed man, and certainly no woman, could 
venture safely off Broadway, even in the daylight"(Bordewich 2002, 48). This 
gruesome account of early Manhattan life prompted Martin Scorsese's 2002 movie 
of the same name. Though few dispute the accuracy of both Asbury and Scorsese's 
accounts of early Manhattan life, the city has evolved greatly since the mid­
nineteenth century. Today at Five Points, one of the major epicenters of early gang 
warfare depicted in Scorsese's epic, "small children clamber over jungle gyms in a 
public park" (Bordewich 2002,49). It is safe to say, that Manhattan has been tamed 
into a livable city. Nevertheless, the ghosts of the past seem to be ever-present, and 
New Yorkers, especially Manhattanites, are wary of violence.
Throughout the early part of the twentieth century, Manhattan emerged as a more 
family-friendly place. It became not only permissible, but customary, to walk on 
the streets in daylight (a novel concept to the earliest New Yorkers), enjoy public 
parks and spaces, and build a life in the bustling metropolis. The city seemed to be 
on a gradual upswing until the late 1960s and 1970s, when it began to spiral out of 
control. C urrents of d iscontent and an astonishing level of governm ent 
mismanagement contributed to a climate of unrest. Numerous events served as 
harbingers of the violence to come, including the Stonewall Riots, which began on 
Friday, June 28, 1969 in "a mafia-run gay bar in Greenwich Village" (NPR 2004, 
online). That a city that was prized for its tolerance would become the site of riots 
over police discrimination was just one sign that the times were changing. Luc Sante, 
author of Low life: Lures and snares of old New York, remarked on his experience 
of New York in the 1970s:
"The New York I lived in...was rapidly regressing. It was a ruin in 
the making, and my friends and 1 were camped out amid its potsherds 
and tum uli...Already in the mid-1970s, when I was a student at 
Columbia, my windows gave out onto the plaza of the School of 
International Affairs, where on winter nights troops of feral d o g s  
would arrive to bed down on the heating grates. Since then the city 
had lapsed even further. On Canal Street stood a five-story building
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empty of human tenants that had been taken over from top to bottom 
by pigeons. If you walked east on Houston Street from the Bowery 
on a summer night, the jungle growth of vacant blocks gave a foretaste 
of the im pending w ilderness, when lianas would engird the 
skyscrapers and mushrooms would cover Times Square.. .At that time 
much of Manhattan felt depopulated even in daylight. Aside from 
the high-intensity blocks of Midtown and the financial district, the 
place seemed to be inhabited principally by slouchers and loungers, 
loose-joints vendors and teenage hustlers, panhandlers and site- 
specific drunks, persons whose fleabags put them out on the street at 
eight and only permitted reentry at six" (2003, online).
The Broader Case
Sante's New York "gained a reputation for being a crime-ridden relic of history" 
(Wikipedia 2005, online), and in the mid 1970s was forced to reorganize its finances 
by the state of New York. As the city attempted to iron out its budgetary woes, 
crime continued to escalate, fueled by rampant police corruption and an ever- 
increasing drug trade (Bratton 1996). When crack hit the streets in the early 1980s, 
it looked as if the city might go under completely (Bratton 1996). Murder rates 
were on the rise, culminating "in 1990, [a year in which] there were 2,246 homicides 
in New York City... an historic all-time high for New York City — 2,246 murders in 
one city, in one year" (Bratton 1996, online). Residents had begun to leave the city, 
and those who stayed felt unsafe, as demonstrated by the decrease in subway 
ridership. According to William J. Bratton, who assumed the position of New York 
City Chief of the Transit Police in 1990, "the impact of societal breakdown was most 
evident in the city's subway system" (1996, online).
The city's subways were filthy and dangerous. More than 5,000 homeless people, 
many recently released from mental institutions as part of a widespread de- 
institutionalization movement, called the subways their home in 1990 (Bratton 1996). 
More than 178 of the homeless people were killed that year as they "fell onto the 
trains, or were hit by trains, or were murdered in the system" (Bratton 1996, online), 
and numerous criminal acts committed by homeless people made the public wary 
of them. Bratton created a plan that drew fire from homeless rights activists. In 
addition to instituting patrols and dummy patrols of the subways, Bratton suggested 
evicting many homeless people from the subway in the bitterly cold winter of 1991 
(Faison 1991). Opponents charged that the homeless people had nowhere else to 
go. According to Doug Lasdon, executive director of the Legal Action Center for
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the Homeless, "The problem is that most of these people don't want to go to the 
shelters" (Faison 1991). Lasdon maintained that the subways should remain an 
option for the housing of the homeless, but Bratton ultimately won out, mobilizing 
units of officers who patrolled and evicted arguably dangerous homeless people 
(Faison 1991, 1). During Bratton's 21-month tenure, serious crime in the subway 
system dropped more than 15%1 (Steinberg 1992). In the years that followed, subway 
crime continued to diminish and ridership subsequently increased. Nevertheless, 
there was an ever-present fear of subway violence looming under the surface.
Whenever it seemed that public transportation was safe, another random, horrific 
crime would grace the front page of the local newspapers. Despite the thousands of 
police officers that had been added to the force in the early 1990s under the auspices 
of the "Safe Streets" program, and the precipitous drop in violent crime rates 
throughout the city throughout the early and mid-1990s, there were still enough 
random, violent incidents to occasion fear amongst city residents (Bratton 1996). 
Take the case of Karen Biolsi, for example. The 38-year-old Long Island resident 
was punched in the face by a homeless man who had multiple prior arrests just 
minutes after she exited her train in Pennsylvania Station (Kennedy 1995). The assault 
took place three days after a federal judge had ruled that Amtrak could not eject 
people from its trains simply because they were homeless (Kennedy 1995). Or 
consider the case of Edward Johnson, a 42-year-old father on his way home to cook 
dinner for his 15-year-old daughter. He was stabbed to death by Zenaida Bennett, a 
28-year-old woman who had been arrested just one week prior on weapons charges 
(Cooper 1997). Or two eerily similar attacks in 1999 in which homeless people pushed 
subway riders onto the tracks -  the first victim was killed, the second's legs were 
severed (Bernstein 1999a; The New York Times 1999a). Amidst all of the news 
coverage of homeless people attacking innocent bystanders, a simple fact was 
overlooked -  homeless people were more often the targets of violence than the 
perpetrators.
In June of 1996, a homeless man clubbed another homeless man to death before 
assaulting a tourist (Stout 1996). In September of 1998, a homeless man was stabbed 
in Central Park and later died from his wounds (The New York Times 1998a). Initially, 
police charged another homeless man with the murder, but released him when his
1 "In 1991,15,572 felonies were reported in the subways, a decline of 2,752 from 1990, when 18,324 
felonies were reported" (Steinberg, 1992, Bl).
Ryan and Williams • The New York Police Officer: Democratic and Moral Accountability in Conflict • Page 15
alibi checked out (The New York Times 1998b). On July 2 2 ,1998, a homeless woman, 
the child of Holocaust survivors, who had grown up in Brooklyn and exhibited 
serious mental illness most of her life, was bludgeoned to death in Central Park 
(Bernstein 1999b). She had been overheard screaming for help, but no one called 
the police (Bernstein 1999b). Despite the fact that homeless people were the victims 
in all of these stories, much of the New York City public had grown increasingly 
frightened of the homeless population since the early 1990s.
Prompted by these fears, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani instituted sweeping reforms. 
After driving the homeless out of the subways and into the shelters, mayor Giuliani 
issued a policy requiring the homeless to earn their shelter stay via work (Whyte 
1999; The New York Times 1999b). This was followed by a decree declaring that 
homeless people were not permitted to sleep on the sidewalks, prompted by a 
midtown attack in which a business man was hit by a homeless man with a brick 
(Whyte 1999). New York City's The Daily News fueled the fire with a front-page 
editorial entitled "Get the violent crazies off our streets" (Whyte 1998). Homeless 
people were no longer allowed in the subways, on the sidewalks, or even in shelters 
if they refused to work. This prompted the still-circulating rumor that mayor Giuliani 
had all of the homeless people rounded up and bussed to Florida. In an increasingly- 
political debate, Hillary Clinton (during her Senate campaign) opposed mayor 
Giuliani's policies, claiming that he was "criminalizing the homeless" (The New 
York Times 1999c). In the midst of all of the political posturing, homeless rights 
advocates were trying to invoke sympathy for New York's homeless residents, many 
of whom were war veterans or mentally ill with no where to go.
In the early 1990s, the plight of the homeless was being compounded by the scourge 
of HIV/AIDS. Housing Works, a non-profit HIV/AIDS activist organization in New 
York estimated that in 1990 there were "fewer than 350 units of supportive housing 
for the estimated 30,000 homeless New Yorkers with AIDS and HIV" and that "AIDS 
was fast becoming a leading cause of homelessness in New York City, with thousands 
living on the streets or in dangerous, squalid, and disease-ridden shelters, with no 
access to healthcare or social services" (Housing Works: History 2002, online).
The face of homelessness was more than just HIV/AIDS victims, however. Homeless 
people came from all walks of life and included domestic violence victims (National 
Public Radio 2001), and thousands of children (Kaufman 2003). Advocates for the 
homeless population in New York stressed the importance of educating the public 
about homelessness and instituting governmental reforms aimed at assisting New
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York City's homeless population, rather than punishing them. Activists such as 
Brother Vishwas Bartolomeu Dias, who had worked at a homeless shelter on the 
Bowery for more than a decade, directly confronted the prevailing ideology of 
dangerous homeless people, stating, "Only the gullible swallow the myth that 
homeless pose a threat to public safety" (2004, A-22). But New York City's effort to 
control the homeless population had just begun.
When Michael Bloomberg took office as mayor in the winter of 2002, he furthered 
former mayor Giuliani's crackdown on the homeless by instituting new police 
procedures that increased the number of homeless people arrested. During one 
month in the fall of 2002, "the police arrested 580 homeless people, compared with 
288 over the same period the previous year, on charges from sleeping in public to 
assault" (Gonzales 2004, B-l). This "spike in arrests of homeless people in the fall of 
2002 led advocates and civil libertarians to sue the Bloomberg administration, 
contending that the police were singling out the homeless" (Gonzales 2004, B-l). 
And then the events of the night of November 22,2002 occurred, and this simmering 
feud between homeless activists and the New York City government began to boil 
over publicly.
Narrower Cases (leading to role play)2
In the wee hours of the night, 39-year-old New York City police officer Jesus Demarco 
and his partner were summoned to the Zeckendorf parking garage just east of Union 
Square (14th street) to talk to a man sleeping under a "no trespassing sign" (Baker 
2002; Gonzales 2004; Wilson 2004; Worth 2004). Upon arriving, Demarco found the 
man already handcuffed by his superior, sergeant Michael Havel (Wilson 2004). 
Havel indicated that the man had refused to go to a homeless shelter and told 
Demarco "he's yours," indicating that Demarco should arrest him (Wilson 2004, B- 
3). Demarco, who had been a member of the New York Police Department (NYPD) 
since 1994 (Worth 2003) had transferred to the Homeless Outreach Unit several 
years before to assist people in this situation, and often befriended the homeless 
people on his beat, quietly offering them food and clothing (Gonzales 2004). He 
talked to the man, and told his supervisor that he refused to arrest him (Gonzales 
2004).
2 Some names and biographical information have been modified.
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Role Play Ground Rules!
Before you move on, let's set some ground rules. You will reach a page called 
STOP! The next four pages after STOP are roles and the fifth  page describes a 
scenario. You and three others should work together. You should read your role. 
You should then read the scenario. DO NOT read the other roles. For the discussion 
phase of this case, you will take the role of (1) Demarco, (2) Demarco's partner (3) 
Sgt. Havel, (4) the homeless man. In the discussion phase, you will represent your 
role in a discussion with three other people. You should choose your role now. 
Then you should read only your role and turn to the page labeled "START!"
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STOP!
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ROLE
Officer Jesus Demarco
You are a nearly 10-year veteran of the New York Police Department (NYPD). You 
are a religious man, a father of four, and a police officer who has been highly 
recognized for his diligent service to the department. You object to arresting 
homeless people, although you have arrested homeless people in the past. Your 
lieutenant recently promised you he would put you on a new detail that would not 
require you to arrest homeless people, but so far he has not come through. Today, 
you need to get home on time so that your wife can go to work, you do not have a 
babysitter. If you do make an arrest, you will inevitably work late.
You do not want to arrest this homeless man, despite the fact that he was found 
sleeping on private property and resisted your supervisor's efforts to assist him in 
finding a shelter. You believe he has come around and is willing to go to a shelter.
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ROLE
Officer Demarco's partner
You are officer Dem arco's partner. You and he have an excellent working 
relationship. You are newer to the force (having only served three years), and though 
you appreciate his desire to assist homeless people, you are also concerned with 
protecting New Yorkers, not to mention your job. Your loyalties must ultimately lie 
with your commanding officer, though this situation presents a gray area. Since the 
command was not directed to you, you are not required to act. Should you speak 
up for your partner's rights? Should you attempt to talk your partner into following 
orders?
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ROLE
Sergeant Havel
You are officer Demarco's supervisor. You are generally highly regarded by the 
officers whom you supervise. You have been given direct orders by your 
commanding officers to clean up the streets and make them safe for tourists and 
residents. Union Square is a particularly busy area and is also in close proximity to 
several New York University dormitories. One of the high profile subway murders 
by a homeless person was not far from the site of this incident. You offered the 
homeless man assistance but he was not willing to take it. Now you have been 
disobeyed by one of your officers.
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ROLE
Ralph James, Homeless Man
You are a 44-year-old Trinidadian native living homeless in New York City. You 
have slept in this garage before, and probably will again. You were offered a chance 
to go to a homeless shelter by Sergeant Havel. You refused. You are perfectly happy 
sleeping in the parking garage. Your experience with shelters has not been good. 
Shelters are often dirty crowded, and violent.
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START!
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Scenario to discuss and enact
Sergeant Havel has just told Officer Demarco that Mr. James "is yours." This is 
police jargon, for "I've cuffed him, now you arrest him." Officer Demarco, must 
decide what to do next, and then everyone else must follow on with appropriate 
decisions.
This discussion will work best as role playing. Don't say what you will do, take the 
voice of your role and "do" it.
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STOP!
Do not read beyond here until after you 
have had your discussion!
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What really happened?
Officer Demarco believed that the man would now go to a homeless shelter, but 
Sergeant Havel viewed Demarco's actions as a direct violation of orders. "He's yours," 
meant "he's your collar, deal with it," jargon that most police officers would interpret 
to mean that an arrest was in order (Wilson 2004, 3). Demarco had just ignored the 
command of his supervising officer. This was grounds for termination.
Almost immediately, officer Demarco's story was front page news all over the state 
of New York. New York City’s friend to the homeless was summarily suspended 
from the department without pay pending a hearing (Baker 2002; The New York 
Times 2004). An NYPD spokesman summed up the charges by explaining that 
officers cannot "pick and choose" which orders to follow (New York Post 2003.19). 
Officer Demarco returned to work one month later, a few days before Christmas 
(The New York Times 2002). As the department slowly assembled evidence for 
officer Demarco's trial, the issue was tried publicly in the court of public opinion. 
Issues of internal NYPD affairs such as arrest quotas and treatment of minority 
officers became fodder for cocktail conversations and would ultimately be a central 
tenet in the defense's opening statement at officer Demarco's trial (Brick 2004). 
Housing Works collected $3,000 for officer Demarco's defense, local clergy spoke 
out on his behalf, and Lieutenant Eric Adams of the "100 Blacks in Law Enforcement 
Who Care" group publicly supported officer Demarco (The New York Times 2002). 
The fervor over officer Demarco's trial continued, though it took more than two 
years for the trial to be convened.
For many, the case seemed open and shut - a veteran officer with a conscience was 
being bullied by a police force known for its harsh policies toward the homeless. As 
the days unfolded, however, the issue became much thornier, as Demarco's character 
was put on trial. Officer Demarco, who maintained that his religious principles 
guided his actions, stated repeatedly during his testimony "my God is in control" to 
explain his decisions (The New York Times 2004; Wilson 2004). However, officer 
Demarco's superiors painted self interest as the motivation for his refusal to arrest 
the homeless man that night. At trial officer Demarco admitted that he had arrested 
homeless people on numerous occasions in the past (The New York Times 2002; 
The New York Times 2004), and that he would arrest them again in the future 
(Gonzalez 2004; Wilson 2004). Additionally, under cross examination, officer 
Demarco admitted that "he was offended that night that a lieutenant who had
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promised to put him on a new detail seemed to have broken his promise" (Wilson 
2004, 3). Finally, officer Demarco admitted that he had needed to get home early 
because his wife had to leave for work and they had no babysitter for their four 
children (Wilson 2004). Officer Demarco testified that whenever he made an arrest, 
he invariably had to wait for the prosecutor to take a statement for up to 4-6 hours 
after the arrest, which inevitably kept him at work late (Wilson 2004). So, was officer 
Demarco a martyr for the homeless, or simply a cop who couldn't be bothered to 
make an arrest in the wee hours of the morning?
Ultimately, officer Demarco was placed on probation for one year. His supporters 
felt that he had been railroaded and that his sacrifices demonstrated glaring faults 
in the New York Police Department. On the other side of the debate, people argued 
that NYPD officers had a duty to protect the public and obey orders. The Post- 
Standard (Syracuse, NY) summed up the controversy: "There are two ways of 
looking at this case: He was insubordinate in defying an order from a supervisor. 
He is being prosecuted for showing compassion. Take your pick" (2004, A-6). And 
what of the homeless man that officer Demarco had risked his badge for that night? 
The man, 44-year-old Trinidadian native Ralph James, was found sleeping in the 
same garage a week after officer Demarco's fateful decision not to arrest him (New 
York Post 2002). "Asked what he would say to the cop who put his job on the line 
for him, the Trinidad native replied curtly: 'zero'" (New York Post 2002, 9).
Ryan and Williams • The New York Police Officer: Democratic and Moral Accountability in Conflict • Page 28
Discussion Questions
Democratic Accountability
1. Is it possible for the public to monitor what bureaucrats, such as police officers, 
are doing each day?
2. What are the pros and cons of allowing the public to directly monitor the activities 
of bureaucrats?
3. Of the two models of civil servants described above (i.e. the patronage system v. 
the civil service system), which seems more efficient? Effective? Fair? Democratic?
4. If the day-to-day operations of the government have to be carried out by people 
who are not elected, what system would you design to ensure that the will of 
the people is actually carried out by the government?
Moral Accountability
1. Does society have contractual obligations to its weakest members to improve 
their lives rather than force them to conform?
2. Are people who choose not to participate in society actively, such as homeless 
people, still members of society, or are they renegades from whom society must 
simply be protected?
3. Must public employees simply obey directives fixed by their democratically 
elected higher authorities (see Herman Finer above)?
4. When should public employees refer to their own moral principles instead of 
the law?
5. Is the principle underlying Article 8 of the Nuremburg trial as important today 
as it was in 1945?
6. Should public employees do what they are told even when they have qualms 
against so doing, as long as the action is legal? If not, what should they do?
7. Does it matter who benefits when public employees perform their functions?
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Case Study
1. Is there a conflict between Officer Demarco's accountability to his moral 
conscience and his democratic accountability?
2. What promises has Officer Demarco made (explicitly or implicitly) by becoming 
a member of the police force? Has he promised to protect the garage? Has he 
promised to carry out whatever laws are passed even if he does not agree with 
them?
3. Should Sergeant Havel consider Officer Demarco's moral stance in deciding 
how to proceed?
4. Immanuel Kant says that the typical criminal is denied his dignity when he is 
not arrested and punished, which is the only way to recognize that he is a rational 
being who is an end-in-himself. Does Mr. James' apparent disregard for his own 
dignity matter from a Kantian perspective?
5. Is Mr. James an equal member of society with the owner(s) of the garage? If so, 
how do we balance their competing needs, desires, and rights?
6. Is Sergeant Havel "using" Officer Demarco’s partner by making him a witness 
to the events?
7. What should the New York Police Department have done about this situation?
Broad Accountability Issue
The broader case introduces another m atter of accountability: this is the 
"accountability" of political decision makers and senior administrators for public 
policies that adversely affect the well being of relatively helpless members of society. 
While not all homeless people are helpless, a large proportion of the homeless are 
mentally ill and a large proportion comprises substance abusers, some are both. If 
public policy disregards the well being of these members of society and lea ves them 
exposed to the risk of untreated mental disease, ostracism, violence, and death, one 
might ask whether there is an accountability issue regarding the behavior of the 
decision makers who have constructed this reality.
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Questions of Broad Accountability
1. Who is responsible for the well-being of homeless people, especially when they 
refuse "help"?
2. Do public decision makers have a responsibility to look beyond the expressed 
popular will and fight for unpopular causes and segments of the population?
3. How should administrators, especially those at lower ranks respond to decisions 
that may not comport with their moral judgments?
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